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Improving security and usability of passphrases with guided
word choice
Nikola K. Blanchard, Clément Malaingre, Ted Selker
ABSTRACT
Passphrases have many uses, such as serving as seeds for passwords.
User-created passphrases are easier to remember, but tend to be
less secure than ones created from words randomly chosen in a
dictionary. This paper develops a way of making more memorable,
more secure passphrases. It investigates the security and usability
of creating a passphrase by choosing from a randomly generated set
of words presented as an array. A usability experiment shows that
participants using this method are weakly affected by the word’s
position in the array, and more importantly by word familiarity.
Passphrases chosen from randomly generated lists achieved 97% to
99% of the maximal entropy in randomly generated passphrases and
caused less than half of the memory mistakes. Prompting a person
with random words from a large dictionary is an effective way of
helping them make a more memorable high-entropy passphrase.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Authentication; Usability in security
and privacy; •Human-centered computing→ Empirical stud-
ies in HCI;
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1 INTRODUCTION
It is hard to make high entropy (highly random) codes, and it is hard
to remember them. Typical uses of passwords have suffered from
serious usability and security problems [Cranor 2014, 2016]. Low-
entropy selection methods, poor memorability, and rules that make
passwords difficult to retrieve all reduce their utility. Biometric
methods are promising, but they still suffer from many vulnerabili-
ties, typically being hacked within six months of introduction [Cao
and Jain 2016; Reddy et al. 2008; Ruiz-Albacete et al. 2008; Smith
et al. 2015]. Biometric security approaches also have an increased
risk of unmitigatable leaks about a particular user [Simoens et al.
2009] (as a retina is harder to change than a password). As well as
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the typical HCI research, the usability of systems is deeply effected
by our access problems.
Systems have a critical need for security alternatives that can
handle sharing and changing the access method (such as giving
a database password to someone for the evening). Longer lists
of words – or passphrases – have been suggested as a possible
solution for improving security [Shay et al. 2014; Topkara et al.
2007]. Although they were introduced as early as 1982 [Porter
1982], dozens of years later passphrases still suffer from problems
similar to the ones passwords have.
Passphrases have been shown to typically be made from inse-
cure, linguistically easy-to-crack patterns [Kuo et al. 2006], like
song lyrics or famous quotes. A significant number of passphrases
created by the Amazon PayPhrase system were easily hackable,
with 1.3 percent of accounts being vulnerable to a 20,000-word
dictionary of terms used in popular culture [Bonneau 2012; Bon-
neau and Shutova 2012]. In another study [Yang et al. 2016], one
passphrase method led 2.55% of users to choose the same sentence.
Despite multiple protocols encouraging users to make personalized
sentences, five out of six methods hadmany occurrences of different
users ending up with the same passphrase. With the single method
that had no two users choose the same password, they still observed
some quotes and famous sentences, but few enough not to have
collisions on a database of only 777 passwords. These studies show
that letting people choose a passphrase with no constraints leads
to low-entropy passphrases, even when giving them instructions
to make personalized passphrases.
For passphrases to be useful, they need to have high entropy. To
achieve this, they have to be not only longer but, more importantly,
less predictable. High-entropy passphrases can then be useful for
many purposes, such as seeding diverse passwords [Blocki et al.
2014] or creating other codes. As opposed to complex passwords
which are hard to remember [Komanduri et al. 2011; Pilar et al.
2012; Yan et al. 2004], passphrases benefit directly from our natural
abilities to remember sequences of words [Baddeley and Hitch
1974; Miller 1956]. They can then serve as a high-entropy source
for methods which avoid the pitfalls of password reuse [Lipa 2016;
Segreti et al. 2017; Wash et al. 2016].
To avoid users choosing common passphrases, one could take
inspiration from standard password practice and draw words uni-
formly from a dictionary. However, this has two drawbacks: first,
the passphrases generated are not individualized and can suffer
from low memorability. Second, to make sure that the user knows
all the words generated, the dictionary from which the words are
drawn must be of limited size.
This paper explores a method of guiding the user to choose
their passphrase from an imposed set of random words. A usabil-
ity experiment explores the factors affecting the word choice, the
participants’ ability to remember their passphrases, and the type
of mistakes they make. Both for primary and secondary English
speakers, this method leads to highly increased memorability of
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the passphrases created. Moreover, since the user can choose from
several words, the dictionary need not be made of only words that
are sure to be known to a user, allowing the use of much bigger
dictionaries, leading to an increase not only in usability but also in
security.
2 METHOD
An online usability experiment explored the impact of creating a
passphrase by choosing words from an array.
2.1 Word choice
Presented guide words were drawn uniformly (each word having
the same probability) from a dictionary crafted for this purpose.
This dictionary is based on the first third of Peter Norvig’s 300000
most frequent n-grams [Norvig 2009]. As those 100000words still in-
cluded words from other languages such as "unglaublichen" as well
as some non-words like "unixcompile", only ones which were also
in the SOWPODS (list of admissible words in English Scrabble tour-
nament) were kept. This created a list of the 87691 most frequent
English words. Thanks to shared roots in words, there is evidence
that most people would know a large majority of them [Brysbaert
et al. 2016; Hartmann 1946]. As the participants chose only 6 words
from the array, having a few unknown words in it did not change
the process or outcome.
To get a variety of behaviours, we experimented with word
arrays of different sizes. To give participants a real choice, the
guide array to choose from was created to be several times the
length of the passphrase created from it. It also needed to not be
so long that people got confused or took too much time making
decisions. An array of size 100 was the biggest that could reliably
fit on a computer screen, and 20 was the smallest that guaranteed
enough possibilities for the user to choose from (38760 in total,
discouting order). Both the 20 and 100 word arrays tested were
also big enough to ensure that the participants could choose from
a sufficient number of words they knew.
2.2 Protocol
The experiment was hosted on a privately hosted server and ac-
cessed remotely over the web. It ran on the Scala Play framework
and a PostgreSQL database. Participants were shown the following
pages, with instructions at the top of each:
(1) A welcome page that gave participants an overview of the
activity and informed them of their rights.
(2) A question asking their age and another asking the main
language they used in everyday life.
(3) A dynamically generated array of either 20 or 100 words (A/B
testing) presented in five columns of either 4 or 20 words.
Participants were told to select 6 words, in the order of their
choice, and input them in the 6 text-boxes at the bottom of
the page.
A control experiment was run to create a baseline for re-
membering a 6-word passphrase. Instead of choosing their
words from an array, a sequence of 6 randomly generated
words was directly given, while informing them that it had
been randomly created.
(4) A page that repeated the passphrase, then prompted partici-
pants to repeat it to themselves until they could remember
it.
(5) A text-box was presented with instructions to type in the
first two letters of each of their words.
(6) A page was presented, showing an array of words that had
previously been presented to another participant. They were
then told to try guessing what words the other participant
had chosen.
(7) A page informing them which if any of their guessed words
were correct, and telling them that they could try to guess
more passphrases if they wanted, or could continue with the
rest of the experiment.
(8) A page asking them to repeat all sixwords from their passphrase
in the same order, or as many as they could think of if they
didn’t remember all of them. If some were missed, they were
then presented with their original array of words as a clue
and asked to find all six of them .
(9) A page thanking them for their participation and inviting
them to encourage others to become participants.
The experiment collected of the following data for analysis:
• Any information entered in the text-boxes.
• All the words and arrays shown to the participants.
• Time spent on each page.
• List of (keystroke/timestamp) couples.
To make sure that no one would try the experiment multiple times
to improve their performance, IP addresses associated with the par-
ticipants were temporarily kept. A single occurrence of a second try
by a participant was detected and was excluded from the database.
2.3 Design choices
Passphrases of length 6 were chosen as they provide the entropy
required in previous work on password generation from passwords.
Moreover, this is compatible with known bounds on memory and
information processing ability [Miller 1956].
The guide array was purposely designed not to line up with the
spaces for words in the passphrase below (as shown on Figure 1) to
avoid confusion in step 3 and separate the guide words from the
user-chosen passphrase. Participants were also told to try to make
their passphrase memorable, for example, by creating a phrase,
rhyme, or sentence from their selected words.
Step 5 was meant to help learn the passphrase and check whether
it was memorized. Step 6 was then introduced as a distractor ex-
ercise introduced to interfere with their short term memory for
passphrases. The idea was to eliminate short term memory of
their initial passphrase by making them think of someone else’s
passphrase.
3 DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
3.1 Participant selection
The principles of informed consent (including right to quit and
right to privacy), not using people in protected classes, beneficence,
justice and minimal deception were followed. All the participants
were volunteers, and were informed of the length of experiment and
that they could quit at any point. They were told that it was an op-
portunity to help them test their memory and for us to understand
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Figure 1: Screenshot of the word choosing interface
how people typed, and that their typing would be monitored. For
privacy, minimal demographic data was collected, corresponding
to aspects that would be relevant to analysing results.
3.2 Recruitment of volunteers
Volunteers were recruited through John Krantz’s Psychological
Research on the Net website[Krantz 1998] which promotes and
indexes experiments of this kind. These volunteers were also en-
couraged to invite others to participate. Late volunteers were hence
partially recruited through social networks. Recruited participants
were not members of protected classes and were informed that
they could leave at any point. They were not asked any identifying
information and were informed not to use their input for security
purposes as their data would be collected for analysis.
3.3 Statistics
Groups. A total of 125 people participated, who were randomly
assigned to three groups. Group 20 was shown an array of 20 words
to choose from and was composed of 47 volunteers. Group 100 was
shown an array of 100 words and had 52 volunteers. The control
group, with 26 volunteers, had their words chosen for them and
shown on the screen.
Age. The participants’ ages showed a large variation, going from
16 to 69, with a notable concentration around 24. The average was
31 years old, and the median 25.
Language. 51 participants wrote down English as their primary
language. French (28) and Hebrew (14 ) were the next two most re-
ported primary languages, followed by Arabic, Norwegian, Russian,
and Romanian.
4 RESULTS
The results focus on how participants chose words and how differ-
ent variables affected their choices, on their ability to remember
the words chosen, and on how they guessed other people’s words.
4.1 Word selection
Based on problems recognized in other studies[Blunch 1984; Lerman
and Hogg 2014; Payne Stanley 1951; Yang et al. 2016; Yue et al. 2010],
an original hypothesis was that word choice would be influenced
by three behaviours:
• Semantic: participants might choose words that are more
frequently used (and with which they were more familiar);
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• Syntactic: participants might choose words that are com-
patible with others they chose, to create a sentence with a
common structure.
• Positional: participants might choose words that are either
among the first they read (on the top left corner), or closest
to the input fields;
A possible outcome that would make the proposed method inef-
fective – because of low entropy – is that people could all choose
the most familiar or frequent words from the array of n words
shown to them. Similarly, strong syntactic tendencies could lower
entropy by reducing the number of probable passphrases. On the
other hand, positional effects tend to increase the entropy as they
don’t depend on human biases but on random position, making the
distribution more uniform.
Results below showed that the second effect is much weaker than
could be expected, with some choosing bias caused by semantic
and positional effects.
4.1.1 Semantic effects. To analyse the semantic effects, we used
a dictionary with words sorted by decreasing order of frequency
in the n-words corpus. Frequent words are all within the first few
thousand words in this dictionary, whereas rare words are at the
end.
The histograms in Figure 2 show the distribution of the words
chosen depending on their frequency rank in the dictionary, for
each of the two main groups. To make the figure more legible, ranks
were aggregated in 30 buckets of 2923 words. Although we can
observe a bias in favour of more frequent and familiar words, it
is not automatic as 23% of words chosen still come from the least
frequent half of the dictionary. This depends on the group, with
group 20 having 26% rare words, and group 100 having 20%.
Figure 2: Frequencies of the words chosen by each group as
a function of their rank in the dictionary, by buckets of 2923
words
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The significant fraction of words chosen from the second half
of the dictionary is not just due to some participants getting only
rare words, as the following figures show. Figures 3 and 4 show
the distribution of words chosen depending on their frequency
relative to the frequencies of the words shown to the participant.
This frequency, F(i), is equal to the number of times the i-th most
frequent word in the array was chosen. Those histograms also
include show the distinction between primary English speakers and
others, inside each group.When given enough choice – in group 100
– non-primay speakers have a bigger tendency to choose frequent
words, with only 15% choosing rarer words. A single participant in
group 20 chose the 6 most frequent words in their array, which is
more than the expectation of uniform random choice of words1.
Figure 3: Relative word frequencies for group 20
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Figure 4: Relative word frequencies for group 100
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4.1.2 Syntactic effects. Using common sentence structuresmight
help memorization, and some participants apparently tried to make
use of this property, one of them choosing "Freshman minions cine-
matically crumble lavender prints". However, most participants did
not seem to follow such a strategy in the passphrases they created.
1Choosing 6 words at random from an array of 20 gives any given outcome with
probability 0.003%.
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Even when limiting the analysis to the four broadest grammati-
cal categories (noun/verb/adjective/adverb), most sentence struc-
tures were unique, with 67 grammatical structures seen only once
out of 99 passphrases. The grammatical structure in the exam-
ple passphrase (noun-verb-noun-noun-verb-noun) is among those
unique structures. 9 structures were seen twice and 3 were seen
thrice. The only relatively common structure, which was present 8
times, corresponds to a sequence of 6 nouns.
Figure 5 shows how present each grammatical category was in
each position in the passphrase. For example, adjectives are less
present as a second word than as a first. There is some imprecision
as words can fit in multiple categories (e.g. scars as a noun or a
verb). Nouns seem overrepresented, but this is consistent with their
frequency in the dictionary (≈ 60%). No correlations were found
between successive word categories, which would be difficult in
any case because of the multiple potential roles of each word and
additional inquiry should be conducted on the subject.
Figure 5: Repartition of grammatical categories by position
in passphrase
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In group 20, 12 people created passphrases that made some
amount of semantic sense and followed English syntax, such as the
example given. 13 passphrases could make some sense but had un-
usual or incorrect syntax, such as "furry grills minidesk newsdesk
deletes internet". 22 appeared to be six randomly ordered words,
such as "wastewater refundable sweatshops misspelling sellout ail-
ment ". In group 100, only 6 people created passphrases that made
some amount of sense and were syntactically correct. 15 made
passphrases that could make some sense, and 30 had passphrases
that seemed randomly ordered.
4.1.3 Positional effects. The heat maps in Figures 6 and 7 show
how the position of a word in the array shown affected the prob-
ability that it would get chosen. The numbers correspond to the
percentage of participants who chose the word in that cell, with a
deeper red indicating a higher percentage. The numbers beside and
below the heat maps represent the total number of words chosen
by line and column.
Figure 6: Heatmap indicating the percentage of participants
choosing the word in each cell for group 100
Figure 7: Heatmap indicating the percentage of participants
choosing the word in each cell for group 20
We can see that there is a bias in favour of the lowest lines of the
array, as well as top line, with little horizontal bias (the choosing
bias is around 11% above average for group 20, with p < 0.02, and
26% for group 100, with p < 0.03, both analyses being done with
ANOVA) .
4.2 Memorization
After choosing a passphrase and performing a distractor task, par-
ticipants were asked to recall their original passphrase; 46% of
participants recalled all 6 words in their passphrase without any
errors. An additional 20% remembered their words but made a typo
somewhere.
The table in Figure 8 sums up the recall success rate and types
of errors when recalling passphrases. A full explanation is given
below. The rates are calculated separately for group 20, group 100,
and the control group. They are also split between the first and the
second section, in which (except for the control group) participants
were reminded of their original array of words.
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Figure 8: Total number of errors by type
Section Correct Typo Variant Order Miss Wrong
1:20 19/47 6 8 6 26 5
1:100 26/51 10 5 3 16 4
Control 6/26 11 11 10 31 12
2:20 14/29 1 2 8 0 3
2:100 15/26 4 2 3 1 4
The following mistakes and errors showed up in participant
recall of newly chosen passphrases:
• Correct shows the proportion of participants who wrote the
passphrase perfectly2.
• Typos are simple one-letter errors or exchanges between
two adjacent letters.
• Variants are like typos in that they are related English words.
Most of those were verbs where the participant added or
removed an ’s’ (or less frequently an ’ed’ or ’ing’).
• Orders are errors where at least two words are exchanged
in the passphrase.
• Misses arewords that are entirelymissing from the passphrase
entered.
• Wrong words are ones that have no relation to any word in
the original passphrase.
Overall, 94% of the 51 people that were guided with 100 words
remembered at least 5 of their words, and 69% remembered all their
words but made a small mistake (like getting them in the wrong
order). 81% of the 47 people who were shown 20 words remembered
at least 5 of their words, and 64% made at most simple mistakes.
Those numbers reach respectively 38% and 27% in the control group.
When comparing the number of people who correctly remem-
bered their whole passphrase, group 100 is superior to the control
group (p < 0.02). This effect is magnified when comparing not
the participants but the words directly. The words in passphrases
made from the 100 words array were better remembered than those
made from the 20 words array (p < 0.03), with only 0.4 words
forgotten or wrong per participant against 0.7. Similarly, the words
in passphrases made from the 20 words array were themselves
much better remembered than the ones given to participants in
the control group (p < 10−4), who had an average of 1.3 words
forgotten.
The creation of sentence-like passphrases had no statistically
significant impact on overall success rate in either group, with a
small decrease in misses and a increase in false words (p > 0.05).
We can also restrict the analysis to those who remembered the
passphrase correctly just after making it in the first exercise (the
one asking them to type the first two letters of each word). This is
shown in Table 9.
Remarks. The preceding error tables do not take into account
four anomalous behaviours. Two participants (one in each group)
2In the table, there is one more participant per group in the second section than there
should be. This is due to one participant in group 100 double-clicking the submit
button and getting directly to the second section, and one participant in group 20
writing nonsense in the first section but getting five correct words in the second.
Figure 9: Errors by type for participants with correct first
exercise
Section Correct Typo Variant Order Misses Wrong
1:20 19/41 4 8 2 14 5
1:100 26/45 9 5 1 14 1
Control 6/15 5 4 1 7 2
made a typo in their original passphrase (phrases were only counted
as correct when typed without the typo). One participant, when
asked for the first two letters for each word in their passphrase,
typed random letters on their keyboard, and one typed something
that looked like the requested twelve-character string with lots of
mistakes. Both of those were in group 20 and were not counted
in the analysis. One participant in group 100 also double-clicked
on the next button and was taken directly to the second try and
shown their array of words. Finally, four participants in the control
group showed no attempt to recall their passphrase, responding
with random words (and in one case not even filling the 6 phrase
positions), and were removed from the dataset. Including these
would have only strengthened the results that guided choice helps.
Language. People that identified their primary language as Eng-
lish were balanced between the two groups (25 of 51 in group 100
and 26 of 47 in the other). Language did not show a statistically
significant effect: 21 out of 51 people who indicated English as their
primary language were correct on the first try, as were 23 out of the
48 who indicated another language. Primary English speakers had
more misses (29 against 13) and an equal share of wrong words.
Time. No statistically significant advantage was shown for par-
ticipants who spent more time designing their passphrase. People
who recalled their words perfectly appeared to take 5-10% longer
on average, but 10-15% less time for the median, showing no clear
effect.
Some of the participants disabled the JavaScript functions needed
to record the time taken3.
4.3 Guessing
Most participants only tried to guess a single other passphrase, but
21 participants tried to guess between 2 and 4 passphrases. Words
that were in the original passphrase with a minor modification
(such as a typo) were counted as correct in this exercise, like those
that were only in the wrong place.
On average, participants succeeded at guessing 0.85 out of 6
words chosen by another person from 100 word arrays, and 2.15
out of 6 words from 20 word arrays. This is significantly higher than
a random guess (which would on average get 0.36 and 1.80 words
correct), but not better than an educated guess focusing on common
words or positions. With access to the array, positional guessing
would get respectively 0.63 and 2.21 words correct. Purely semantic
guessing would get respectively 1.40 and 2.93 words correct.
3These are disabled by default on most Apple iPhones.
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Figure 10: Cumulative distribution function of indices of words chosen for both groups and 6 models
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5 STATISTICAL MODELLING
5.1 Strategies and entropy
The effect of participant choice on the entropy of passphrases was
tested. Models simulated in Python were used to analyse the word
choice of participants when presented with arrays of words, with
three main strategies:
The Smallest(n) strategy corresponded to picking the six most
frequent words presented in the array of n words.
The Uniform(n) strategy being equivalent to sampling random
words uniformly from a dictionary of size n, entropy was computed
exactly. The table in Figure 11 shows the entropy per word for each
of the described strategies, as well as a few others. The 87691 here
corresponds to our described dictionary of 87691 words, and 300000
to Norvig’s more complete dictionary of 300000 words.
Finally, the Corpus(n) strategy corresponded to picking each
word from an array of nwords according to a distribution where the
probability to pick each wordw is a function of f (w), its frequency
in the language. This corresponds tomodels for how the distribution
of words in the English language – among others – is biased in
many different corpora of texts. The model used here is Zipf’s
law[Ha et al. 2002], stating that the probability of choosing a word
p(w), is inversely proportional to its rank in the frequency list:
p(w) ∝ 1
rank(w)
Informally, the 100th most used word is chosen with a frequency
about twice the frequency of the 200th most used word.
109 simulations were run for both 20-word and 100-word arrays
with each strategy to estimate the probabilities – and the entropy4.
For entropy E, the formula to compute it is:
E = −
∑
i
pi ln(pi )
In this formula, pi is the position in an ordering of word frequency
that the word occupies in the array of words.
A much bigger sample would be needed to exactly compute the
entropies of user behaviours. However, experimental entropy can
be bounded by using distributions for known entropies. As such,
the cumulative distribution functions for the experimental groups
and models were computed. Although they do not make direct
strategic sense, we included Corpus(17) and Corpus(13) in Figure 10,
as they bound the observed curve for group 20.
Experimental values for group 20 are slightly above Corpus(17)
around the 50000th word. An upper bound of Corpus(20) could be
chosen, but there is a strong argument for using Corpus(17). This is
more affected by the values of the high pi , as the function changes
less as it gets to the least common words (making it concave). As
the pi s shown in Figure 10 are also sorted in decreasing order, it
means a small bump in word choice in the first part of the curve is
4The error bounds due to the simulations are quite smaller than 0.01 bits.
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Figure 11: Strategies and entropy
Strategy Entropy (bits)
Uniform(87691) 16.42
Corpus(13) 16.25
Corpus(17) 16.15
Corpus(20) 16.10
Corpus(30) 15.92
Corpus(100) 15.32
Uniform(10000) 13.29
Smallest(20) 12.55
Uniform(5000) 12.29
Uniform(2000) 10.97
Smallest(100) 10.69
Corpus(300000) 8.94
Corpus(87691) 8.20
more than compensated by the lack of a bump in the second part.
As such, it is reasonable to infer that the entropy corresponding to
participants’ behaviours in this group is between Corpus(13) and
Corpus(17).
A slightly tighter fit can be obtained by taking not the simplest
Zipf’s formula but the more general one, with, for β > 1:
p(w) ∝ 1
(rank(w))β
In such a case, setting β = 1.35 makes Corpus-Zipf (13) a tighter fit
than previous curves, giving an entropy of 16.19 bits5. However,
the presence of noise in the data means that a search for a more
accurate model would be premature.
All in all, this shows that six-word passphrases generated with
the method proposed and a 100-word array have at least 95 bits of
entropy, and ones created with a 20-word array have nearly 97 bits
of entropy.
5.2 Semantic aspects
This section has focused on the frequency of words as a proxy for
their familiarity. This ignores other possibilities such as emotional
attachment to certain words, linked to the particularities of each
user. For example, a dog owner would most probably choose the
word dog if it appeared in the array. We can show here that the
magnitude of such an effect should be quite low.
Let’s suppose that each user has a list of 100 words that they
will automatically choose whenever they appear. They have the
opportunity of choosing such a word with probability at most
1 − (1 − 10087685 )
100 ≈ 11%
5One could also use a Zipf-Mandelbrot model [Oldfield 1968], but the additional
parameter would be hard to validate accurately without having a sample of at least
10000 participants
An adversary with the word list could, for each position, try this list
of words and fill the rest with a dictionary6, lowering the number of
possibilities to test. With probability 0.11, such an adversary could
then reduce the total entropy from 95 bits to 89 bits.
Moreover, many emotionally-loaded words such as "dog", "love"
or "president" are already among the most frequent words (the ones
given are all in the top 1000). As such, most people would choose
themwith a high probability, no matter their individual preferences,
so the marginal information – and the corresponding entropy loss
– should be even lower than the bound already given.
6 LIMITATIONS
6.1 Ecological validity
As this was an online study which did not happen in a controlled
laboratory environment, anomalous participant behaviour could
not be detected. The main risk we can think of comes from users
writing down their passwords somewhere, affecting the memorabil-
ity results. Two arguments make it probable that this had little to
no impact on the results. The first comes from the fact that writing
down one’s passphrase should take a certain amount of time, and
there was no demonstrated correlation between the speed during
the creation and the ability to remember one’s passphrase correctly.
The second comes from [Yang et al. 2016], where participants in
the study were encouraged to create passphrases and use any tech-
nique they generally used to remember passwords and passphrases.
Despite knowing in advance that they would have to remember
the passphrase for a week, over 80% of participants reported not
having written down their passphrase.
6.2 Short-term and long-term memory
As the users were not asked any identifying information, it was not
possible to ask them to return to the experiment, to estimate the
effects of the method on long-term memorability of passphrases.
The main reason we added the distractor task in the experimental
protocol was to affect the participant’s short-term memory to look
at long-term memory effects. We compared our recall rates with
the long-term recall rates for the variety of passphrase creation
strategies shown in [Yang et al. 2016]. The after-distractor mem-
orability observed here is closer to the long-term memorability
they observed. This is consistent with the fact that no variation in
recall rates between strategies was observed in their short-term
experiment, unlike their long-term experiment and our data.
6.3 Free choice of words
This study did not include a fourth group who were free to choose
words in any way they wanted. This could have been interesting
in the goal of comparing memorability but two factors motivated
the absence of this second sort of control group. The first is that
we could not ensure that people would pick new sentences and not
ones they were already trained on, which would skew the results.
More importantly, we believe that the behaviours observed in [Yang
et al. 2016] indicate that free word choice is too much of a security
concern, and not a viable option.
6Getting a single word from the list is already a low-probability event, and getting
more than one happens with probability at most 2 ∗ 10−4 .
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7 DISCUSSION
The above results demonstrate that passphrases created by choos-
ing words from an array of random words are more memorable
than automatically generated ones. While past studies have shown
that choosing familiar words for passphrases led to huge entropy
reductions, our technique obviated this. The entropy cost due to
the choice in our system is negligible, staying between 1% and 3%
depending on array size. The method also allows the use of a larger
dictionary to choose known words from, leading to much higher
entropy per word in the end.
Multiple surprising behaviours were observed, confirming cer-
tain hypotheses and refuting others. Firstly, the participants’ choices
were influenced by the positions of the words in the arrays pre-
sented to them. In group 20, this led 41% of them to choose the word
in the upper left corner, instead of the expected 30%. Variations of a
factor two between different lines of the array were found in group
100. There was a significant bias in favour of the last lines, and a
smaller one for the top line, with no significant horizontal effect7.
The tendency to choose familiar words was stronger than the
positional bias, although the linguistic bias was still weaker than
the one in the English language (as predicted by Zipf’s law). We
observed that Corpus(13-17) might be better fits than Corpus(20)
for group 20. This can be explained by the fact that its participants
took the second line of the array at a lower frequency. Similarly,
positional effects could partially explain why the distribution is
closer to Corpus(30) than Corpus(100).
One might expect participants to use mnemonics and create
sentence-like passphrases that used common patterns, but the only
syntactic pattern that appeared more than thrice was 8% of partic-
ipants choosing three nouns in a row. As nouns form the bigger
share of the dictionary used, even those passphrases are secure,
reducing the entropy by at most 5 bits (out of more than 96 bits of
entropy). Surprisingly, having more words to choose from did not
increase the tendency to create syntactically correct sentences but
reduced it instead.
The position bias should not be seen as a weakness of the system
but as another source of its security: as the position is truly random,
a stronger positional bias leads to a more uniform – and higher-
entropy – passphrase. This is true as long as the adversary cannot
get the initial word list, but in such a case the system is already
unsecure.
Word choice patterns held across the range of proficiencies in
English. Those results are true not just for primary English speak-
ers but also for people for whom it is a second language, with
small differences in word choice and no significant difference in
memorability.
The task where participants were supposed to guess each other’s
words had a purpose beyond distracting and impairing their mem-
ory.Wewere hoping to find whether a simple strategy could explain
the participants’ choices, in which case some would get very good
results. The absence of such successful participants shows that if a
general strategy to explain participants’ choices exists, it has eluded
both us and them.
7Unfortunately we did not compare multiple ways of presenting a word field. While a
linear presentation of the choice words was not tested, it would be likely be much less
user-friendly.
8 CONCLUSION
This paper shows that guiding people to choose from an array of ran-
dom words can build a high-entropy, more memorable passphrase.
Choosing from an array successfully stops people from choosing
easy-to-guess favourite words. The reduction in entropy when com-
pared with random passphrase generation is offset by the improved
usability and memorability that come with choice. Since people
can choose words they know, larger dictionaries can be used. Final
entropy by word then exceeds the levels of random passphrase
generation by 20 − 30%, reaching 95 and 98 bits of entropy.
The main predictor of word choice from the random word array
was how familiar a word was to the participant, for both primary
and non-primary speakers. However, this bias was weaker than
expected and letting people choose from an array gave between
97% and 99% of the maximal entropy achievable, depending on the
size of the array.
Bigger array size (giving more choice to the participant) was
linked to improved memorability of the passphrase. With a 100-
word array, 94% remembered at least 5 of their 6 words the first
time they were asked to recall, despite performing a distractor task.
With actual use, remembering the passphrase should be easy.
The advantage of selecting from an array of random words is
that it gives users an easy way to create secure and memorable
passphrases, with only a random generator and a dictionary. Se-
curity of the guiding array is achieved by only generating it when
needed, locally on the user’s machine. Generating a list which
would then be sent over the network is highly inadvisable as it
drastically lowers the entropy, even more so if the adversary knows
the position of the words. However, this should never be a problem
in practice as the secret array to select from can be produced on
any machine, the dictionary itself and the code needed taking less
than 300KB of memory.
Thiswork demonstrates that large improvements can be achieved
in passphrase usability while increasing their entropy. Below are a
few suggestions for usability/security questions left to test for the
guided passphrase scenario:
• Howwell does the short-termmemorability with a distractor
task predict long-term memorability for passphrases?
• Can putting high-frequency words closer to the middle of
the array compensate for the positional advantage?
• Can other visual presentations, such as word clouds, make
word choice from the presented set even more uniform?
• Would the high uniformity of word frequency be as or even
more successful with even larger dictionaries, for example
with the full SOWPODS and its 276663 words?
• Why is choosing from 100 words more memorable than
choosing from 20? It isn’t because people took longer, as
they didn’t. It might be as it gives users more personalized
choices or the ability to select more familiar words. It might
also be for some not yet explored reason. Does memorability
continue to increase with arrays of more than 100 words?
What is the nature of the trade-off, and must there be a
compromise between entropy and memorability?
• How does the size of the array affect reading patterns and
word choice? Does the left-wise bias in group 20 come from
different reading patterns?
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• A significant portion of the errors, both in this study and
previous ones [Yang et al. 2016], come from simple errors
like typos or an added ’s’. It is possible to create an error-
tolerant passphrase authentication system, but how would
one make it compatible with the usual hash-and-compare
techniques?
• Are there even better ways to make highly-memorable high-
entropy passphrases?
Making easy-to-remember passphrases, such as presented here,
should improve security for many purposes. With these demon-
strations, we hope to inspire more work that will make secure
passphrases that are as easy to remember as the song you can’t get
out of your head.
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